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Preschool for All: Plyler V. Doe in The Context of
Early Childhood Education
Shiva Kooragayala

ABSTRACT
In its 1982 opinion in Plyler v. Doe, the Supreme Court held that a state could not
deny undocumented children living within its borders a public and free K-12 education.
This Note argues that Plyler’s protections extend to publicly-funded early childhood
education programs that serve children between the ages of three and five. Due to the
broad support of researchers, educators, and the general public, early childhood education
programs funded by local, state, and the federal governments have become an integral part
of a comprehensive public education today. While these early childhood education
programs are nominally open to all students who meet program-specific age, income, and
geographic residency requirements, undocumented children and children of
undocumented parents face a variety of indirect and direct barriers to entry that range
from onerous and arbitrary identification requirements to attempted outright bans on
enrollment based on immigration status. Taking a prophylactic approach, this Note details
how denying access to public early childhood education programs to these young children
contradicts the spirit and central holding of Plyler. In this era of judicial restraint and
heightened xenophobia, the enduring precedent of Plyler offers an avenue for families,
policymakers, and advocates to ensure that all children, regardless of their immigration
status, can receive a comprehensive public education that includes early childhood
education.
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“The expedience of this state’s policy may have been influenced by two
actualities: children of illegal aliens had never been explicitly afforded any
judicial protection, and little political uproar was likely to be raised in their
behalf.”—Doe v. Plyler1
INTRODUCTION
After the Supreme Court’s 1982 ruling in Plyler v. Doe, undocumented students
were finally permitted to attend public primary and secondary schools.2 In the case, the
Supreme Court invalidated a Texas statute that empowered school districts to deny
admission to undocumented students under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.3 By doing so, the Supreme Court ensured that an entire cohort of children
would not be deprived of basic literacy and a public school education.4
In consideration of the Supreme Court’s ruling, this Note asserts that Plyler’s
protections also extend to publicly funded early childhood education programs that serve
children between the ages of three and five.5 Today, early childhood education is an integral
component of a comprehensive public education, and as such, public early childhood
education falls within the gambit of Plyler’s protection.6 The federal government as well
as many states and municipalities offer their own forms of public early childhood education
programs7 that are nominally open to all students who meet the respective age, income,
and geographic state residency requirements.8 Enrolling in these programs can be
incredibly beneficial for young children—social scientists have demonstrated that early
childhood education has positive effects on cognitive development, school readiness,9 and
academic achievement.10 However, not all children stand to benefit from these public
programs. Undocumented children and children of undocumented parents face a variety of
1

Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 589 (E.D. Tex. 1978).
457 U.S. 202 (1982). This Note uses the terms “primary and secondary” to refer to kindergarten to twelfth
grade. See generally MICHAEL OLIVAS, NO UNDOCUMENTED CHILD LEFT BEHIND: PLYLER V. DOE AND THE
EDUCATION OF UNDOCUMENTED SCHOOLCHILDREN (2012).
3
Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. at 569; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
4
See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. at 202.
5
This paper uses the terms “preschool,” “pre-K,” and “early education programs” interchangeably,
following popular parlance. While programs can vary significantly between jurisdiction, these programs are
generally voluntary, free, public, and intended for students between the ages of three and four.
6
See infra Part III.
7
CHRISTINE JOHNSON-STAUB, EQUITY STARTS EARLY: ADDRESSING RACIAL INEQUITIES IN CHILD CARE
AND EARLY EDUCATION POLICY 4 (Dec. 2017),
https://www.clasp.org/sites/default/files/publications/2017/12/2017_EquityStartsEarly_0.pdf.
8
State and federal programs vary on the age thresholds. See generally State of Preschool Yearbook: 2018,
NAT’L INST. FOR EARLY EDUC. RESEARCH (2018), http://nieer.org/state-preschool-yearbooks/2018-2.
9
The U.S. Department of Education identifies five “domains” of school readiness: language and literacy
development, cognition and general knowledge, approaches to learning, physical well-being and motor
development, and social and emotional development. See Race To the Top – Early Learning Challenge
Program: Definitions, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., https://www.ed.gov/early-learning/elc-draftsummary/definitions. See also Kevin Woodson, Why Kindergarten Is Too Late: The Need for Early
Childhood Remedies in School Finance Litigation, 70 ARK. L. REV. 87, 97 (2017).
10
See Julia Isaacs, Impacts of Early Childhood Programs, BROOKINGS INST. 4−6 (2008),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/09_early_programs_isaacs.pdf.
2
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barriers to enrollment that keep these short- and long-term benefits of early childhood
education out of their reach.11
Some of these public state and local programs ask parents to provide social security
numbers and state-issued birth certificates when trying to enroll their, while others have
attempted to prohibit undocumented children altogether on the basis of their immigration
status.12 Pervasive and deep-seeded hostility towards immigrants, the threats of adverse
immigration action associated with the receipt of public benefits, reports of Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) activity around preschools, and uncertainty about the
scope of immigrant rights all deter undocumented parents from enrolling their children in
these public early childhood education programs.13
The enduring precedent of Plyler offers important protection for the millions of
undocumented families living in the United States today. It provides an important avenue
for challenging these enrollment barriers that uniquely impact undocumented children and
children of undocumented parents. It enables courts to protect the ability of these children
to avail themselves to a comprehensive public education—an education that includes early
education. While the Supreme Court was silent on the question of whether undocumented
children would be able to attend public early childhood education programs, its silence
merely reflects the relative paucity of these programs in 1982, when it issued its opinion in
the Plyler case.14 Moreover, Plyler allows the courts to circumvent the more
constitutionally difficult and controversial issues of recognizing a substantive “right to
education” or interfering with immigration reform efforts.
Part I of this Note outlines the growth and embrace of public early childhood
education by federal, state, and local governments and describes the barriers to entry that
face undocumented children today. Part II lays the foundation for the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Plyler and explains how the case remains relevant and potentially powerful in
future litigation. Part III argues that denying access to public early childhood education,
either directly or indirectly, to these young children contradicts the spirit and central
holding of Plyler. Taking a prophylactic approach, Part IV describes how advocates,
parents, and policymakers may use the broader interpretation of Plyler articulated in this
Note to challenge and prevent future attempts to bar children from accessing public early
education programs solely because of their immigration status.

See Julia Gelatt et al., Supporting Immigrant Families’ Access to Prekindergarten, URB. INST.ITUTE,
16−17 (2014), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/22286/413026-Supporting-ImmigrantFamilies-Access-to-Prekindergarten.PDF.
12
Id. Christina Samuels, Indiana’s Pre-K Pilot Caught Up in Immigration Debate, EDUC. WK. (Sept. 8,
2015), https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2015/09/09/indianas-pre-k-pilot-caught-up-inimmigration.html?print=1. See also Wendy Cervantes et al., CTR. FOR LAW. & SOC. POLICY, Our
Children’s Fear: Immigration Policy’s Effects on Young Children 13 (2018),
https://www.clasp.org/sites/default/files/publications/2018/03/2018_ourchildrensfears.pdf.
13
See JOHN W. BORKOWSKI, NAT’L SCH. BDS. ASS’N & NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N, LEGAL ISSUES FOR SCHOOL
DISTRICTS RELATED TO THE EDUCATION OF UNDOCUMENTED CHILDREN 11 (Lisa E. Soronen ed., 2009),
https://cdn-files.nsba.org/s3fs-public/reports/UndocumentedChildren.pdf?z7FPI9ZVydzCAmZq1GgB_mDWu9Z.jIvX.
14
See generally Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
11
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I. THE PROMISE OF EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUCATION
A. History of Public Early Childhood Education

Since the 1960s, educators, policymakers, and the general public have increasingly
embraced and invested in public early childhood education in the United States.15
The federal government was first to develop public early childhood education
programming in the United States when, in 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson launched
the federal Head Start Program (“Head Start”) within his “War on Poverty” to “help break
the cycle of poverty by providing preschool children of low-income families with a
comprehensive program to meet their emotional, social, health, nutritional, and
psychological needs.”16 The initial motivation for public investments in early childhood
education through Head Start centered on closing racial and economic achievement gaps
as well as breaking the cycle of entrenched poverty in the country.17
These early investments in public early childhood education were partially a result
of the rising need for childcare outside the home after World War II. The war brought about
a widespread entry of women into the formal labor force outside the home.18 Before this
shift in the household structure, albeit a generalization, one parent typically functioned as
a wage-earner while the other provided childcare and early education inside the home.19
As more households began to have two wage-earning parents, the need for childcare and
early childhood education outside of the home grew. While some families, both then and
now, rely on familial or other social networks or are able to pay for private early childhood
15

Between 2003 and 2015, state governments increased investments in early education programs by more
than 200 percent. DEP’T OF EDUC., A MATTER OF EQUITY: PRESCHOOL IN AMERICA 5 (2015),
https://www2.ed.gov/documents/early-learning/matter-equity-preschool-america.pdf. See generally Sonya
Michel, The History of Child Care in the U.S., VCU LIBR. SOC. WELFARE HIST. PROJECT,
https://socialwelfare.library.vcu.edu/programs/child-care-the-american-history/.
16
From its inception, Head Start has served three and four-year-old students. GA. DEP’T OF EARLY CARE &
LEARNING, History of Head Start, http://www.decal.ga.gov/HeadStart/History.aspx (last visited July 10,
2019). See also COMPTROLLER GEN. OF THE U.S., PROJECT HEAD START: ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROBLEMS 2
(1975), https://www.gao.gov/assets/120/115310.pdf [hereinafter PROJECT HEAD START REPORT]; EDWARD
ZIGLER ET AL., A VISION FOR UNIVERSAL PRESCHOOL EDUCATION 2−5 (2006)
17
See BARBARA BEATTY, PRESCHOOL EDUCATION IN AMERICA: THE CULTURE OF YOUNG CHILDREN FROM
THE COLONIAL ERA TO THE PRESENT 52−132 (1995).
18
Craig T. Ramey & Sharon Landesman Ramey, Reframing Early Childhood Education: A Means to
Public Understanding and Support, in THE CURRENT STATE OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE ON PREKINDERGARTEN EFFECTS 93 (Deborah A. Phillips et al. eds., 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2017/04/duke_prekstudy_final_4-4-17_hires.pdf; James E. Ryan, A Constitutional Right to
Preschool, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 49, 51 (2006); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2012–2016 AMERICAN COMMUNITY
SURVEY 5-YEAR ESTIMATES: TABLE S2301 (2018),
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ACS_17_5YR_S2301&
prodType=table (last accessed Nov. 2019) (In 2018, 72.2 percent of women between the ages of 20 and 64
participated in the labor force).
19
See EMILY D. CAHAN, PAST CARING: A HISTORY OF U.S. PRESCHOOL CARE AND EDUCATION FOR THE
POOR, 1820−1965, 30−32 (1989), https://www.researchconnections.org/childcare/resources/2088/pdf. The
percentage of women working for pay has steadily increased; in 2017, 69.6 percent of married mothers
worked for pay. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Table F-14. Work Experience of Husband and Wife–All MarriedCouple Families, by Presence of Children Under 18 Years Old and Median and Mean Income: 1976 to
2017, http://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/income-poverty/historical-income-families.html
(last accessed Sept. 2019).
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education or childcare,20 these options are neither practicable nor affordable for a large
share of American families, and particularly for low-income families.21 This is where Head
Start fits in. In 2019, “Head Start provides grants to local public and private non-profit and
for-profit agencies to provide comprehensive child development services to economically
disadvantaged children and families, with a special focus on helping preschoolers develop
the skills they need to be successful in school.”22 The program enrolled almost one million
students in 201723 and provided services to approximately eight percent of children ages
three to five24 through a summer school program as well as through programming during
the school year.25 Congress added the Migrant and Seasonal Head Start program in 1969
to serve children of migrant farm workers and Early Head Start in 1994 to serve children
under the age of three.26
Unlike in the case of K-12 education, where the impetus for publicly funded
education came from state governments, the federal government drove the push for public
early childhood education,27 partially due to a consensus amongst researchers that
investments in early childhood education are worthwhile.28 Social science evidence
indicates that early childhood education critically influences a student’s school readiness.29
School readiness skills, such as self-regulation, can predict longer-term academic
achievement in reading and math.30 Students who receive a high-quality education prior to
entering Kindergarten are also more likely to experience tremendous gains in cognitive
development, which refers to the ability to build working memories, and cognitive
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., A MATTER OF EQUITY: PRESCHOOL IN AMERICA 1 (Apr. 2015),
https://www2.ed.gov/documents/early-learning/matter-equity-preschool-america.pdf.
21
See Press Release, Rafael Medina, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, New Interactive Reveals the True Cost of
Quality Early Childhood in Each U.S. State (Feb. 14, 2018),
https://www.americanprogress.org/press/release/2018/02/14/446590/release-new-interactive-reveals-truecost-quality-early-childhood-education-u-s-state/ (follow interactive “Where Does Your Child Care Dollar
Go?” hyperlink; then select “Illinois” for state field and select “Preschool” for child’s age field) (estimating
that the monthly cost of high-quality preschool in Illinois is around $822 a month in 2018).
22
Head Start Program, 75 Fed. Reg. 57,704, 57,704 (proposed Sept. 22, 2010) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R.
pt. 1307) available at https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2010/09/22/2010-23583/head-startprogram. See also Sheila B. Kamerman & Shirley Gatenio-Gabel, Early Childhood Education and Care in
the United States: An Overview of the Current Policy Picture, 1 INT’L J. CHILD CARE & EDUC. POL’Y 23,
31 (2007), https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/2288-6729-1-1-23.
23
Kamerman & Gatenio-Gabel, supra note 22, at 31.
24
Id.
25
DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., Head Start Federal Funding and Funded Enrollment History (2017),
https://eclkc.ohs.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/hs-federal-funding-enrollment-history.pdf.
26
HEAD START TIMELINE, https://eclkc.ohs.acf.hhs.gov/about-us/article/head-start-timeline (last updated
Feb. 16, 2019).
27
Kamerman & Gatenio-Gabel, supra note 22, at 2.
28
PROJECT HEAD START REPORT, supra note 16, at i (there is a “consensus . . . that Head Start participants
are better prepared to enter local schools than their disadvantaged, non-participating peers.”). However,
studies showed that the educational gains children experienced after participating in Head Start
programming waned after they transitioned to elementary school, raising prospects that continued
investments in early and primary education might offset such losses. Id. at 5 (asserting that “[the] loss of
early gains may be attributable to intervening factors over which Head Start has no control”).
29
See Woodson, supra note 9, at 97 (showing that school readiness encompasses various non-academic
qualities such as social and emotional development, physical well-being, and language development).
30
Id. at 103.
20
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flexibility.31 Quality early childhood education programs can also nurture childhood
development, working against any adverse childhood experiences that children may
experience in their first years of life.32 Furthermore, the research shows that at least in the
short-term, high quality early childhood education closes disparities in academic
performance and reduces socioeconomic and racial disparities in literacy and learning.33
The benefits associated with early childhood education are particularly salient for
children of immigrants and English-language learners.34 Participation in early childhood
education programs eases integration for children of immigrants and can help these
children gain English language skills at a critical age.35 Finally, a copious amount of

31

See Adele Diamond et al., Preschool Program Improves Cognitive Control, 318 SCI. 1387, 1387 (2007)
(referring to a set of non-academic skills that are “more strongly associated with school readiness than are
intelligence quotient (IQ) or entry-level reading or math skills.”); Rhoshel K. Lenroot & Jay N. Giedd,
Brain Development in Children and Adolescents: Insights from Anatomical Magnetic Resonance Imaging,
30 NEUROSCIENCE & BIO-BEHAVIORAL REV. 718, 720 (2006) (showing that by age five, the human brain
grows to ninety percent of its adult weight). See generally Deborah A. Phillips et al., The Current State of
Scientific Knowledge on Pre-Kindergarten Effects, BROOKINGS INST. 19 (2017).
32
See Deborah A. Phillips et al., Puzzling It Out: The Current State of Scientific Knowledge on PreKindergarten Effects, in THE CURRENT STATE OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE ON PRE-KINDERGARTEN
EFFECTS, supra note 31, at 25–27; see also DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ASPE RESEARCH BRIEF:
THE SHORT- AND LONG-TERM IMPACTS OF LARGE PUBLIC EARLY CARE AND EDUCATION PROGRAMS 1–2
(2014), https://aspe.hhs.gov/system/files/pdf/180301/rb_longTermImpact.pdf.
33
Mark Lipsey et al., Evaluation of the Tennessee Voluntary Prekindergarten Program: End of Pre-K
Results from the Randomized Control Design (Research Report), VAND. U. PEABODY RES. INST. 10 (2013)
(showing that students who participated in Tennessee’s pre-K program scored approximately one-third of a
standard deviation higher on cognitive tests than students who did not enroll). See Jens Ludwig & Deborah
A. Phillips, Long-term Effects of Head Start on Low-income Children, 1136 ANN. N.Y. ACAD. SCI., 257,
268 (2008); Allison Friedman-Krauss et al., How Much Can High-Quality Universal Pre-K Reduce
Achievement Gaps?, CTR. FOR AMER. PROGRESS (Apr. 5, 2016, 9:00 AM),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/early-childhood/reports/2016/04/05/132750/how-much-can-highquality-universal-pre-k-reduce-achievement-gaps/; see also William T. Gormley, Jr. & Ted Gayer,
Promoting School Readiness in Oklahoma: An Evaluation of Tulsa’s Pre-K Program, 40 J. HUM.
RESOURCES 533 (2005) (A study on Tulsa, Oklahoma’s universal prekindergarten program showed
improvements in reading, writing and math skills that accrued in a matter of a few months).
34
See Gellatt et al., supra note 11, at 8 (a quasi-experimental evaluation of Oklahoma’s prekindergarten
program found that gains in math skills were larger for children with parents born in Mexico and for
children where Spanish is the primary language spoken at home than for children whose parents were born
in the United States. Evidence from Georgia’s prekindergarten program shows that children with lower
English proficiency had larger increases in language, literacy, and math test scores, whether measured in
Spanish or in English, and that children with lower English proficiency made greater gains in measured
general knowledge than did other students. Finally, in Nebraska, English Language Learners in
prekindergarten showed a larger increase in knowledge and skills between the fall and the spring than did
other children).
35
See Phillips et al., supra note 31, at 22 (“Research to date finds that pre-k enrollment can enable these
children to make progress in English language proficiency and in their academic skills, each of which likely
supports growth in the other. As a result, DLLs can experience especially rapid growth in early learning
when exposed to supportive and rich learning opportunities in pre-k.”). Findings on the longer-term
benefits of early childhood education are more varied. Phillips et al. write that “the available evidence
about the long-term effects of state pre-k programs offers some promising potential but is not yet sufficient
to support confident overall and general conclusions about long-term effects.” Id. at 47.
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research indicates that investments in early childhood education can be valuable for longterm macroeconomic goals in addition to these other more individualized benefits.36
In part due to the strength of this collection of research, state and local actors began
to play a larger role in funding public early childhood education programs. Currently, fortythree states offer some form of early childhood education, and numerous cities have begun
to offer their own versions as well.37 In five states and the District of Columbia, more than
seventy percent of four year old children enrolled in public early childhood education
programs during the 2016-2017 school year.38 The District of Columbia enrolled eightyeight percent of four year olds, Florida enrolled seventy-seven percent of four year olds,
and Vermont enrolled seventy-five percent of four year olds during the 2016-2017 school
year.39 In 2017, as a whole, state programs served approximately five percent of three year
olds and thirty-three percent of four year old children who were enrolled in public early
childhood education programs.40
Many states and municipalities have followed the federal model and target children
based on a variety of factors including income, parental education, and English as a second
language.41 State and local programs vary on whether they are open to three year olds in
addition to four year olds, whether they offer full-day or part-day programming, and
whether they are run directly by the government or by contracted providers.42 Because
there are no mandates dictating the quality or scope of these programs from the federal
government, apart from Head Start, states and municipalities vary on how much they
expend per pupil.43 Nevertheless, some states like Oklahoma, Florida and Georgia, as well
as many municipalities, have increasingly rallied around “universal” early childhood
education programs that serve all children regardless of a family’s income or a child’s
ability.44
36

Robert Lynch & Kavya Vaghul, The Benefits and Costs of Investing in Early Childhood Education: The
Fiscal, Economic, and Societal Gains of a Universal Prekindergarten Program in the United States, 20162050, WASHINGTON CTR. FOR EQUITABLE GROWTH (Dec. 2015); see generally Byron G. Aguste et al., The
Economic Cost of the U.S. Education Gap, MCKINSEY & CO. (June 2009),
https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/social-sector/our-insights/the-economic-cost-of-the-us-educationgap.
37
See generally Pre-K in American Cities, NIEER, http://nieer.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Pre-KReport-Final.pdf.
38
Friedman-Krauss et al., supra note 33, at 24.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 14.
41
Id. at 7.
42
See ZIGLER ET AL., supra note 16, at 7.
43
See Friedman-Krauss et al., supra note 33, at 6−12.
44
Id. at 7−8. See About Voluntary Prekindergarten, FLA. OFF. OF EARLY LEARNING,
http://www.floridaearlylearning.com/vpk/floridas-vpk-program (last visited Mar. 10, 2018) (Florida’s
“Voluntary Prekindergarten Education Program” serves “nearly 80 percent” of 4-year-olds in the state, with
the goal of meeting all need); Kate Taylor, New York City Will Offer Free Preschool for All 3-Year-Olds,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/24/nyregion/de-blasio-pre-kexpansion.html (“Implementing the universal prekindergarten program for 4-year-olds was the centerpiece
of Mr. de Blasio’s campaign for mayor four years ago and is considered to be one of the biggest
accomplishments of his first term. So it is not surprising that, with his re-election effort starting, he is
seeking to amplify the achievement.”); see also John Byrne, Emanuel Calls for Free Full-Day Public
Preschool for 4-Year-Olds, CHI. TRIB. (May 30, 2018),
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This Note does recognize that early childhood education is different than primary
and secondary education. Because children are not required to enroll in these programs,
enrollment in public education programs will likely neither reach 100 percent nor will
achieve the rate of enrollment in public K-12 schools. However, this voluntariness of
enrolling in early childhood education does not affect the central question nor the thesis
purported by this Note. The question driving this Note pertains to whether students can
equally access public early childhood education programs. As programs expand and more
children enroll in public early childhood education, those who are unable to enroll will be
increasingly disadvantaged. The consequences of exclusion from public early childhood
education on student achievement and other educational outcomes will grow more severe
with time.
The following subpart identifies how undocumented children and children of
undocumented parents, in particular, face a variety of barriers to access that limit their
enrollment in these programs.
B. Immigration Status as a Barrier to Entry
Notwithstanding increased popular and governmental support for early childhood
education,45 at least some parents lacking legal documentation face barriers when
attempting to enroll their children in public early childhood education programs—barriers
that are connected solely to their immigration status.46 The type and severity of these
barriers vary state to state and program to program. Examples of barriers, both direct and
indirect, are described below.
1. Direct Barriers to Enrollment: The Example of Indiana’s “On My Way Pre-K” Pilot
Program
In 2015, the State of Indiana attempted to bar undocumented children from enrolling
in its pilot universal preschool program for four-year old kids.47 Indiana’s pilot program
garnered tremendous media pushback and elicited strong reactions from advocates and
policy makers. 48 In response to the proposed pilot program, Former Secretary of Education
Arne Duncan stated:
“Nothing in federal law requires state or local preschool programs to
exclude any child from participation on the basis of their immigration status,
and doing so just doesn't make sense.” 49

https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/politics/ct-met-emanuel-education-announcement-20180529story.html.
45
See supra Part I(A).
46
See generally Hannah Matthews et al., Immigration Policy’s Harmful Impacts on Early Care and
Education, CLASP (Mar. 2018),
https://www.clasp.org/sites/default/files/publications/2018/03/2018_harmfulimpactsece.pdf.
47
Samuels, supra note 12.
48
Press Release, Arne Duncan, U.S. Sec’y of Educ., Statement from U.S. Secretary of Education Arne
Duncan on Indiana Denying Preschool to Undocumented Children (Aug. 14, 2015),
https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/statement-us-secretary-education-arne-duncan-indiana-denyingpreschool-undocumented-children.
49
Id.
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The former Secretary’s argument illustrates an important point: Indiana’s attempt to
restrict access to these children reflected more of an ideological choice rather than
compliance with any federal or state mandate to do so. The decision was an explicit and
intentional classification based on immigration status. While Indiana’s pilot program
exemplifies a rather rare and extreme case of exclusion, it illustrates much of the motivation
for this paper and underscores the need for adequate protections for this group of children.
There is no indication that these sorts of attempts to bar children from enrolling in
public early childhood education programs will disappear with time. In fact, the opposite
seems to be true: given heightened xenophobia and anti-immigrant policy making at every
level of government, city, state or federal policy makers may try and erect these kinds of
direct barriers to access in the future.
2. Indirect Barriers to Access
Far more prevalent than policies or practices that directly bar access to enrollment
are indirect barriers that can deter and discourage undocumented parents from enrolling
their children in public early childhood education programs. This subpart describes a
variety of indirect barriers to access, including onerous application requirements,
heightened anti-immigration rhetoric, and the increased risk of adverse governmental
actions aimed at undocumented families.
Important to note, however, is that Head Start does not directly limit enrollment to
students lacking documentation. While Congress limited undocumented individuals’
access to a variety of public benefits in the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA),50 it exempted Head Start.51 Local agencies administering
early childhood education programs relying on funding from the federal Child Care and
Development Block Grant Program, which funds state programs that administer programs
pursuant to federal Head Start, are similarly not allowed to deny access on the basis of
immigration status.52 Nevertheless, the indirect barriers described in this subpart are both
present and applicable for parents who want to enroll their children in these federallyfunded programs that are administered by state and local actors.
The first type of indirect barrier arises from difficult, onerous, and arbitrary
application requirements.53 The vast majority of state and municipal programs do not
50

8 U.S.C.A §§ 1621, 1622 (West 2000) (The Act created a comprehensive statutory scheme for
determining aliens’ eligibility for federal, state, and local benefits and services and prevents undocumented
immigrants from being eligible for federal financial aid or student loans).
51
James A. Harrell, Clarification of Interpretation of “Federal Public Benefit” Regarding Child Care and
Development Fund (CCDF) Services, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., ADMIN. ON CHILD.,
YOUTH AND FAMILIES (Nov. 25, 1998), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/occ/pi9808.pdf (in a
Public Instruction, the Administration for Families and Children explicitly states: “Head Start and Early
Head Start have been determined not to provide ‘Federal public benefits’ because non-post-secondary
education benefits were expressly omitted from the statutory definition in title IV of PRWORA. Therefore,
Head Start providers are not required to implement PRWORA’s verification requirements.”).
52
See Hannah Matthews, Immigrant Eligibility for Federal Child Care and Early Education Programs,
CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF LAW & SOC. POL’Y (Apr. 2017),
https://www.clasp.org/sites/default/files/public/resources-and-publications/publication-1/ImmigrantEligibility-for-ECE-Programs.pdf.
53
See Gelatt et al., supra note 11, at 16.
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facially restrict enrollment to immigrants lacking legal immigration status. However,
municipal and state funded programs tend to require forms of identification that are
unavailable or difficult to obtain for undocumented parents, even if their children were
born in the United States. Examples of these types of documentation requirements include
the parent or guardian’s government issued identification or driver's license, the child’s
state-issued birth certificate, and the child, parent, or guardian’s social security number.54
Undocumented parents are by definition ineligible to obtain government-issued
identification, drivers licenses, or social security numbers. Moreover, undocumented
parents may face difficulties in accessing their children’s birth certificates either because
their children were born abroad, or because undocumented parents lack the federally
approved identification that are sometimes necessary for obtaining their children’s birth
certificates in this country.55 Even supposedly universal early childhood education
programs like the one adopted in Oklahoma request documentation in the form of stateissued birth certificates.56 Additionally because the majority of programs today are meanstested, many programs require proof-of-income documentation that can be difficult to
obtain for parents who work in domestic or in other types of nonstandard work
arrangements.57 Because many undocumented parents are employed in these sorts of workarrangements, these requirements can have a disproportionate effect on the children of
undocumented parents.
Arkansas’ “Better Chance” program, open to families earning less than 200% of the
poverty line, exemplifies how these implicit barriers can work. The authorizing legislation
requires the program to “admit eligible students without regard to race, gender, national
origin, ancestry, color, disability, creed, political affiliation, or religion.”58 Notably missing
from this list is immigration status; nevertheless, the program requires parents to provide
birth certificates as part of its application process.59
The purpose of requiring these forms of documentation is for programs to verify that
children meet their programmatic age, state residency, and income requirements—not to
establish immigration status. While some programs do allow parents to provide alternative
identification, the mere existence of the documentation requirements can discourage
parents from enrolling their children in public early childhood education programs.60

54

Pre-K for All: Enroll Now!, IMPACT TULSA, http://www.impacttulsa.org/pre-k-tulsa/frequently-askedpre-k-questions/ (last visited July 29, 2019).
55
Gelatt et al., supra note 11, at 16.
56
Pre-K for All, supra note 54. Many of these programs, including the one in Oklahoma, do not provide
much guidance for how parents can circumvent these requirements.
57
Gelatt et al., supra note 11, at 17 (some programs have developed processes that alleviate these burdens
on families including by allowing a broad range of documents to serve as proof of income or by allowing
parents to self-certify their incomes through letters from employers).
58
RULES GOVERNING THE ARK. BETTER CHANCE PROGRAM 23.04.1 (ARK. DEP’T OF EDUC. 2012).
59
Id. at 4.06.
60
See BORKOWSKI, supra note 13, at 23 n.2 (“The Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund
(MALDEF), among other groups, has concluded that Plyler requires that school districts not ‘engage in any
practices that ‘chill’ or hinder the right of access to school”) (quoting Letter from MALDEF to Dr. Sandra
Ellis, Superintendent, North Chicago Community Unit Schools (Aug. 9, 2007)), available at
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/files/north_chicago_school_district.pdf.; see also Gelatt et
al., supra note 11, at 16−18.
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These sorts of requirements can deter some parents from enrolling their children in public
programs for which their children are otherwise eligible.
A second type of indirect barrier stems from parents’ legitimate fears of facing
adverse immigration actions, such as deportation, if they enroll their children in these
public programs. As an example, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in 2017 to amend the “Inadmissibility and Deportability
on Public Charge Grounds” rule, also known as the public charge rule.61 The public charge
doctrine is not new. Under the long-standing definition, “a public charge is a person who
is primarily dependent on the government for subsistence. A person deemed likely to
become a public charge can be denied admission to the U.S. or the ability to become a
lawful permanent resident.”62 DHS’s original proposed rule that was leaked to the media63
attempted to include Head Start as a factor to determine whether a person would be a public
charge.64 Tacitly, DHS’s original proposal would have treated an undocumented parent’s
decision to enroll their child in Head Start as an indicator for long-term dependency on the
state. Neither the updated NPRM nor the final rule included Head Start as a basis to
determine whether an individual was a public charge .65 Nevertheless, DHS’s attempt to
include the program raises multiple concerns. First, it shows that the government was
interested in limiting access to early childhood education on the basis of immigration
status—that too, legal immigration status. Second, it raises the possibility of such explicit
barriers to enrollment in the future.
The growth of overt anti-immigrant policies and rhetoric used by political leaders
and official policies also deters parents enrolling their children in early childhood
education. Candidates for public office have run campaigns centered on deporting
undocumented families. For example, then-gubernatorial candidate Brian Kemp of
Georgia recorded an official campaign ad during which he stated: “I got a big truck, just in
case I need to round up criminal illegals and take ’em home myself. Yep, I just said that.”66
Government officials at the highest levels have also stroked fear amongst immigrant
61

Inadmissibility and Deportability on Public Charge Grounds, Notice For Proposed Rule [Insert main
page title here] (2017), https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=201710&RIN=1615AA22
62
The Trump Administration’s “Public Charge” Attack on Immigrant Families: Information About an
Upcoming Proposed Rule, NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CTR., https://www.nilc.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/01/Public-Charge-Fact-Sheet-2018.pdf (last updated Apr. 12, 2018).
63
Yeganeh Torbati, Trump Administration May Target Immigrants Who Use Food Aid, Other Benefits,
(Feb. 8, 2018, 1:19 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-services-exclusive/exclusivetrump-administration-may-target-immigrants-who-use-food-aid-other-benefits-idUSKBN1FS2ZK.
64
Dara Lind, Trump’s Draft Plan to Punish Legal Immigrants for Sending US-Born Kids To Head Start,
(Feb. 8, 2018, 7:37 PM), https://www.vox.com/2018/2/8/16993172/trump-regulation-immigrants-benefitspublic-charge. The leaked draft includes the following provision under “§ 212.23: Public benefits
considered for purposes of public charge inadmissibility: . . . (14) [c]ertain educational benefits, including,
but not limited to, benefits under the Head Start Act, as amended 42 U.S.C. 9801 et seq.” The leaked
document is available at: https://cdn.voxcdn.com/uploads/chorus_asset/file/10188201/DRAFT_NPRM_public_charge.0.pdf.
65
Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. 41,292 (Aug. 14, 2019) (to be codified at 8
C.F.R. pts. 103, 212-214, 245, and 248), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/08/14/201917142/inadmissibility-on-public-charge-grounds.
66
Ryan Bort, These Georgia Republican Campaign Ads Are Somehow Not Fake, ROLLING STONE (July 20,
2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/brian-kemp-ads-701456/.
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families in their official capacities. For example, when asked the question of whether
school officials could report children to ICE before the House Education and Workforce
Committee, the Secretary of Education responded, “That’s a school decision. It’s a local
community decision . . . we have laws and we also are compassionate.”67 This sort of
interpretation of the “laws” cited by the Secretary is faulty68 and dangerous. Since the 2016
presidential election, federal ICE agents, in their attempts to find and deport undocumented
individuals, have reportedly targeted early childhood education childcare centers in their
attempts to arrest undocumented individuals.69 While ICE’s policies fall beyond the scope
of this paper, its practices incite fear in parents who wish to enroll their children in early
childhood education programs.70
The goal of this Note, and primarily the next two parts, is to illustrate how our “laws”
can be interpreted to protect rather than deter these children’s’ ability to access early
childhood education programs. In particular, the case of Plyler v. Doe, which is the focus
of the next Part, provides an avenue through which courts can challenge barriers to entry
connected to immigration status. The next Part discusses the Supreme Court’s decision,
and Part III supports the position that early childhood education falls within Plyler’s scope.
II. THE CASE OF PLYLER V. DOE
In the case of Plyler v. Doe, the Supreme Court faced the question of whether public
schools can exclude students based on their immigration status.
Texas enacted Section 23.031 of the Texas Education Code in 1975,71 which
permitted public school districts to deny admission and charge tuition to students who were
67

Michael Stratford, DeVos: Schools Should Decide Whether to Report Undocumented Kids, POLITICO,
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/05/22/undocumented-children-schools-devos-immigration-603277
(last updated May 22, 2018 6:49 PM).
68
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., Fact Sheet: Information on the Rights of All Children
to Enroll in School, https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/dcl-factsheet-201101.pdf (last revised
June, 2012) (“School districts that either prohibit or discourage, or maintain policies that have the effect of
prohibiting or discouraging, children from enrolling in schools because they or their parents/guardians are
not U.S. citizens or are undocumented may be in violation of Federal law.”).
69
See Cervantes et al., supra note 12, at 17 (2018) (In their study on the impacts of immigration policy on
young children, the authors describe the following: “In nearly all our interview sites, we heard disturbing
accounts of ICE practices that undermine the best interest of children. In several sites, ICE reportedly
parked outside schools and child care centers at drop-off or pick-up times and arrested parents on the way
to drop children off or take them home. ‘ICE can’t go inside the schools, but they can be outside,’ a parent
in California said, demonstrating the confusion regarding the Department of Homeland Security’s sensitive
locations policy that restricts ICE and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) from carrying out enforcement
actions at certain locations—including schools and child care centers. ‘And if they are outside, it’s the same
thing as being inside, so people say it’s better not to take the kids to school or not go there.’”)
70
See Matthews et al., supra note 46, at 22.
71
TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.031 (West 1981) (repealed 1995) (current version at TEX. EDUC. CODE
ANN. § 25.001) ((a) “All children who are citizens of the United States or legally admitted aliens and who
are over the age of five years and under the age of 21 years on the first day of September of any scholastic
year shall be entitled to the benefits of the Available School Fund for that year. (b) Every child in this state
who is a citizen of the United States or a legally admitted alien and who is over the age of five years and
not over the age of 21 years on the first day of September of the year in which admission is sought shall be
permitted to attend the public free schools of the district in which he resides or in which his parent,
guardian, or the person having lawful control of him resides at the time he applies for admission. (c) The
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not “legally admitted” to the United States.72 Pursuant to the new law, the Tyler
Independent School District, located in Tyler, Texas, began charging undocumented
students a $1,000 a year in tuition and began requiring students to produce birth certificates
for enrollment.73
A group of Mexican families affected by the policy sought relief in court and
“complained of [their] exclusion . . . from the public schools of the Tyler Independent
School District.”74 Each of the plaintiffs’ families had lived in Tyler for at least three years
prior to the commencement of the case, and at least one had lived in the city for thirteen
years.75 One scholar noted that one of the plaintiff’s father’s “decision [to file suit] required
genuine bravery because he felt that doing so substantially increased the risk of deportation
for him and his family.”76
Through their class action, the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief in the Southern
District of Texas on the basis that the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) preempted
the contested Texas statute and violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.77 Relying on the Supreme Court’s opinion in San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez, Judge William Wayne Justice ruled the Texas statute could
not withstand a minimal rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause.78 The
district court held that the defendants’ argument that educating undocumented children
would be impermissibly burdensome to the state did not constitute a rational basis for the
law or policy of excluding children who lacked legal status.79 The district court also held
board of trustees of any public free school district of this state shall admit into the public free schools of the
district free of tuition all persons who are either citizens of the United States or legally admitted aliens and
who are over five and not over 21 years of age at the beginning of the scholastic year if such person or his
parent, guardian or person having lawful control resides within the school district.”).
72
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 205 (1982) (The statute allowed districts to “deny enrollment in their public
schools to children not ‘legally admitted’ to the country.”).
73
Catherine Winter, ‘All They Wanted To Do Was Get An Education,’ APM REP. (May 30, 2017),
https://www.apmreports.org/story/2017/05/30/all-they-wanted-to-do-was-get-an-education; Jamie
Williams, Children Versus Texas: The Legacy of Plyler v. Doe 4 (Apr. 2011),
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Children_v._Texas_Williams.pdf.
74
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. at 206.
75
Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 574 (E.D. Tex. 1978). See Barbara Belejack, A Lesson in Equal
Protection, TEX. OBSERVER (July 13, 2007, 12:00 AM), https://www.texasobserver.org/2548-a-lesson-inequal-protection-the-texas-cases-that-opened-the-schoolhouse-door-to-undocumented-immigrant-children/;
Paul Feldman, Texas Case Looms Over Prop. 187’s Legal Future, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 23, 1994),
http://articles.latimes.com/1994-10-23/news/mn-53869_1_illegal- immigrants; Katherine Leal Unmuth,
Tyler Case Opened Schools to Illegal Migrants, DALL. MORNING NEWS (June 14, 2007),
http://shapleigh.org/news/1328-tyler-caseopened-schools-to-illegal-migrants; Mary Ann Zehr, Case
Touched Many Parts of Community, EDUC. WK. (June 6, 2007),
https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2007/06/06/39plylerside.h26.html (subscription required to access).
76
JUSTIN DRIVER, THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE, PUBLIC EDUCATION, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE BATTLE
FOR THE AMERICAN MIND 350 (Pantheon Books eds. 2018). Because of the risk of deportation, the four
families who were part of the original suit filed the case under pseudonym.
77
OLIVAS, supra note 2, at 17–20.
78
Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. at 580 (citing San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 93 S.
Ct. 1278 (1973)) (In Rodriguez, the Supreme Court held that education is not a fundamental right and failed
to apply strict scrutiny review in assessing the constitutionality of a Texas school-financing system under
the equal protection clause).
79
Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. at 585.
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that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to all persons, regardless of citizenship.80 Judge
Justice worried that if the Texas statute were to stand, it would disallow the children from
entering public schools and could cause them to “become permanently locked into the
lowest socioeconomic class,”81 mirroring the Supreme Court’s concerns in Brown v. Board
of Education.82 He also held that federal law preempted the Texas statute, given the clear
dominance of federal government in the field of immigration.83 Judge Justice struck down
Section 21.031 only as it pertained to Tyler’s school district,84 and the Fifth Circuit upheld
the ruling in part on appeal.85
The district court’s ruling in this original Plyler case inspired seventeen other
challenges to the legality of Section 21.031 across the state. The Southern District of Texas
consolidated these cases into In re Alien Children Education Litigation.86 In this second
wave of litigation, the district court similarly held that Section 21.031 violated the Equal
Protection Clause and went as far as to say that “the absolute deprivation of education
should trigger strict judicial scrutiny, particularly when the absolute deprivation is the
result of complete inability to pay for the desired benefit.”87 As such, the court applied
strict scrutiny and held that the challenged law did not substantially relate to any
compelling state interest.88 The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, and the defendants
subsequently appealed the decision.89
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, consolidated both appeals, and issued a final
opinion on June 15, 1982.90 Justice Brennan first held that the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment reaches undocumented immigrants on the reasoning that a
state’s jurisdiction reaches all “persons” within its jurisdiction.91 He carefully relied on the
legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment and wrote that “citizens or strangers,
within this land, shall have equal protection in every state in this union in the rights and
liberty and property.”92
Then, the Court decided on which analytic framework under the Equal Protection
Clause —rational basis review, strict scrutiny, or something in the middle—would be
appropriate for the set of facts underlying this case. The level of scrutiny informs the
80

Id. at 579.
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 208 (1982) (citing Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. at 577).
82
347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
83
Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. at 592.
84
Id. at 593.
85
The Fifth Circuit disagreed that Section 21.031 was preempted by federal law. Doe v. Plyler, 628 F.2d
448, 450 (5th Cir. 1980).
86
501 F. Supp. 544, 549 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
87
In re Alien Children Ed. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 544, 582 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
88
Id. at 583.
89
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982).
90
See id. at 202.
91
Id. at 210, 215 (citing the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Brennan wrote that “[n]o State shall . . .
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” The Court held that “within its jurisdiction … confirms,
the understanding that the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment extends to anyone, citizen or stranger,
who is subject to the laws of a State, and reaches into every corner of a State’s territory. That a person’s
initial entry into a State, or into the United States, was unlawful, and that he may for that reason be
expelled, cannot negate the simple fact of his presence within the State’s territorial perimeter.”).
92
Id. at 214 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 1033 (1866)).
81
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Court’s determination of whether a challenged law or policy is sufficiently tailored to a
state interest and how important that interest is to the state.
In this case, the Plyler Court chose not to apply strict scrutiny for two reasons.
First, the Court found that “illegal aliens” do not constitute a “suspect class”
because “their presence in this country in violation of federal law is not a “constitutional
irrelevancy” and because their entry into the class was “a product of voluntary action.”93
However, Justice Brennan focused on the unique characteristics of the plaintiff children
who were injured by Section 21.031 to extend them a “quasi-suspect" status of sorts.94 To
this end, Justice Brennan wrote:
“Persuasive arguments support the view that a State may withhold its
beneficence from those whose very presence within the United States is the
product of their own unlawful conduct. These arguments do not apply with
the same force to classifications imposing disabilities on the minor children
of such illegal entrants.”95
The children lacked authority over their own circumstances, which set them apart
from adults who arguably have more agency over the decision to migrate to the United
States without documentation. The majority noted that penalizing children for the decisions
of their parents had no rational justification and could not “comport with fundamental
conceptions of justice.”96 Likewise, in his powerful concurrence, Justice Powell
emphasized that children are innocent, citing Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., where
the Supreme Court had held that penalizing children “for the misdeeds of the parents is
illogical, unjust, and ‘contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should
bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing.’”97
Second, the Court relied on its previous ruling in Rodriguez that education does not
constitute a “fundamental right,” which would have triggered strict scrutiny. However,
Justice Brennan acknowledged that public education is not “merely some government
‘benefit’ indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation”98 and wrote that
“education has a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society.”99 Harkening
to its ruling in Brown, the Court stressed that the ability for children to avail themselves of
a public education was too important in terms of their ability to become full participants in
our society.100 Thus, the majority appeared to treat public education as a sort of quasifundamental right.101
As a result, while the Court acted as it was applying ordinary rational basis review,
it applied a heightened form of rational basis review, much akin to the intermediate scrutiny
93

Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. at 216, 219, n. 19.
Id. at 244.
95
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. at 219–20.
96
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. at 220.
97
406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
98
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. at 221.
99
Id. at 244.
100
See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (“[I]t is doubtful that any child may reasonably be
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the
state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.").
101
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. at 221.
94
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framework that the Court had begun to use when assessing gender-based classifications.102
Justice Brennan wrote, “[i]f the State is to deny a discrete group of innocent children the
free public education that it offers to other children residing within its borders, that denial
must be justified by a showing that it furthers some substantial state interest.”103
Justice Brennan struggled to identify how Section 21.031 served any such
substantial state interest.104 In its defense, the State of Texas offered several justifications
for the statute. Importantly, these arguments continue to underlie the contemporary
immigration debate in 2019. First, Texas argued that allowing undocumented children to
attend public schools would amount to tacitly condoning illegal immigration.105 The Court
was “reluctant to impute to Congress the intention to withhold from these children …
access to a basic education.”106 Second, Texas argued that undocumented children placed
“special burdens” on the its ability to provide quality education to its remaining students.107
Texas could not provide any conclusive evidence that offering education to this group of
children affected incentivized further undocumented immigration nor that these children
posed significant economic burdens on the state.108 Third, Texas argued undocumented
children were less likely to remain within the state after graduation because of their lawful
status. The Court also rejected this argument as well on the basis that this risk was present
with any child. On the whole, the majority was unconvinced that depriving children of a
public education met any substantial state interest and concluded that Texas’s arguments
lacked sufficient supporting evidence. The Court reasoned that the costs associated with
educating these children outweighed any immigration-related costs that Texas allegedly
purported to be saving.109
Because of the majority’s ruling, children lacking legal documentation have been
given the opportunity to gain a public school education.110 The legacy of Plyler is evident
today: public school districts may not bar undocumented children from admission to
elementary or secondary schools; it “stands for the abolition of castes and an affirmation
of equality—two precepts which should be bedrock principles of the critical democratic

102

See U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996). Contra Steven G. Calabresi & Lena M. Barksy, An
Originalist Defense of Plyler v. Doe, 2017 BYU L. REV. 225, 227–28 (2017) (“The Court essentially
followed a Lochnerian approach to the Fourteenth Amendment even though it used the post-New Deal
rational basis test and the concept of ‘strict scrutiny.’”).
103
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. at 230.
104
Id. at 244.
105
Id. at 228.
106
Id. at 225.
107
Id. at 229.
108
Id. at 228 (“To the contrary, the available evidence suggests that illegal aliens underutilize public
services, while contributing their labor to the local economy and tax money to the state.”).
109
Id. at 222 (“The inability to read and write will handicap the individual deprived of a basic education
each and every day of his life. The inestimable toll of that deprivation on the social economic, intellectual,
and psychological well-being of the individual, and the obstacle it poses to individual achievement, make it
most difficult to reconcile the cost or the principle of a status-based denial of basic education with the
framework of equality embodied in the Equal Protection Clause.”).
110
DRIVER, supra note 76 (While not popularly known outside the realm of the legal academy, Justin
Driver writes that “Properly understood, [Plyler] rests among the most egalitarian, momentous, and
efficacious constitutional opinions that the Supreme Court has issued throughout its entire history.”).
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moment in which we live.”111 Public schools may not even inquire as to these students’
immigration status.112 The following Part explains how the Court’s reasoning in the case
supports the position that public early childhood education programs fall within the realm
of Plyler’s protections.
III. PLYLER REACHES EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUCATION
This Part describes how the Supreme Court’s language, arguments, and general spirit
support the position that Plyler’s protections extend to public early childhood education
today.
A. Early Childhood Education is Integral to a Comprehensive Public Education
Following the Supreme Court’s analytical approach in Brown, this Note considers
the current state of public education to assess whether Plyler does indeed apply in context
of public early childhood education. In Brown, the Court looked at the state of public
education in 1954, when the case was heard, instead of at the time of the passage of the
Fourteenth Amendment in reaching its ultimate conclusion that “separate educational
facilities are inherently unequal.”113 Under this analytical framework, early childhood
education is an integral part of a comprehensive public education today.114
Factors on the supply and demand sides of the equation support this position. As
discussed in Part I, cities, states, and the federal government are much more significant
providers of early childhood education today than in 1982.115 A larger share of families are
seeking to enroll their children in public early childhood education programs than in 1965,
when President Johnson launched Head Start, or when the Plyler case was decided in 1982.
Fewer than ten percent of students were enrolled in public early childhood education
programs in 1980.116 From 1980 to 2017, the percentage of children between the ages of
three and five children enrolled in public early childhood programs quadrupled, rising to
almost forty percent.117
As more parents are enrolling their children in public programs and as states and
municipalities open additional classroom seats, early childhood education is becoming
more widely recognized as a public good akin to traditional K-12 public education.
111

María Pabón López, Reflections on Educating Latino and Latina Undocumented Children: Beyond
Plyler v. Doe, SETON HALL L. REV. 1373, 1377 (2005); Catherine E. Lhamon et al., Dear Colleague Letter:
School Enrollment Procedures, Plyler, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & U.S. DEP’T. OF EDUC. 1 (May 8, 2014),
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201405.pdf.
112
Lhamon et al., supra note 111.
113
See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (“Even in the North, the conditions of public
education did not approximate those existing today . . . [I]t is not surprising that there should be so little in
the history of the Fourteenth Amendment relating to its intended effect on public education.”).
114
See Michael A. Rebell, Poverty, "Meaningful" Educational Opportunity, and the Necessary Role of the
Courts, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1467, 1476 (2007) (Professor Michael Rebell makes the argument that early
childhood education programs are a component of a right to “comprehensive educational equity.”); Ryan,
supra note 18, at 77 (arguing that “[a] strong legal case, therefore, can be made for including universal
preschool in any definition of the right to an adequate education.”).
115
See also supra Part (I)(A).
116
Phillips et al., supra note 31, at 6.
117
Id.
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Enrollment in early childhood education has become essential for students to achieve many
of the core purposes of public education.118 In Brown, the Supreme Court emphasized
several characteristics of public education, including that “it is required in the performance
of our most basic responsibilities … it is the foundation of good citizenship … a principal
instrument in awakening the child to cultural values … in preparing him for later
professional training … [and] in helping him to adjust normally to his environment.”119
The Plyler court itself emphasized the importance of the role of a basic education in
teaching students how to read and write and becoming self-sufficient in our society.120
These goals are not dissimilar from the goals of early childhood education programs today.
Professor James Ryan, a leading expert on law and education, writes:
“[A]s more children enroll in publicly funded pre-K programs, it may
become harder for states to say that pre-K is not part of their public
education systems. At a certain point, suggesting that only some students
are entitled to pre-K could be akin to saying that only some students can
attend Kindergarten – or third grade.”121
Moreover, there is widespread popular support for public investments in early
childhood education today.122 A 2017 national poll of bipartisan voters revealed that
eighty-nine percent of voters support “making early childhood education and child care
more affordable for working families” for children from birth through age five.123
Conservative and liberal lawmakers from both ends of the ideological spectrum have
included expansions of public early childhood education programs in their policy
platforms.124 The public embrace of investing in public early childhood education is
partially due to the sympathetic character of the intended beneficiaries of these
investments: young children under the age of five. Educating young children remains
politically and socially palatable in this era of partisanship. As such, arguments for
supporting these investments mirror those made for the expansion of kindergarten a
hundred years ago.125
B. Young Children Fall within Plyler’s Scope
The population of focus in this Note, namely children between the ages of three and
five lacking documentation are similar to the plaintiffs in Plyler. This group of children
has little to no control on the immigration decisions of their parents or on their
118

See supra Part(I)(A).
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
120
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 222 (1982).
121
James E. Ryan, A Constitutional Right to Pre-K?, EDUC. WK. (Mar. 9, 2016, 6:52 AM),
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circumstances in the United States. Their realities are shaped entirely by the decisions of
their parents. Therefore, a central concern of the Plyler majority is relevant and appropriate
in this context: depriving children of early childhood education penalizes them for the
decisions of their parents and does not “comport with fundamental conceptions of
justice.”126
Furthermore, early childhood education is much more similar to K-12 education than
post-secondary education. The courts’ refusal to extend Plyler to post-secondary
education,127 despite the urging of scholars in the area,128 based of its differences from K12 education in fact further supports the applicability of Plyler to early childhood
education. In Regents of University of California v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, for
example, the court failed to extend Plyler’s heightened scrutiny to post-secondary
education, arguing that “[t]here is, of course, a significant difference between an
elementary education and a university education.”129 This difference, namely centers on
the purpose of primary—and early education—to ensure that our children will be able to
contribute to civic institutions and to the betterment of our nation from a fundamental
sense.130 Furthermore, “no court appears to have adopted [the] view … [that] higher
education currently plays the same socioeconomic role that primary and secondary
education played in the 1970s and 1980s.”131
Moreover, numerous states have enacted laws or policies that limit access to public
post-secondary education, to in-state tuition, and financial aid in various ways.132 Congress
enacted PWRORA to limit “state and local public benefits” to undocumented immigrants
who are “not lawfully present in the United States” unless states pass legislation that
“affirmatively provides” for their eligibility in the benefit programs. 133 As a result,
undocumented students are ineligible for in-state tuition to public post-secondary
institutions unless a state statute explicitly provides for such benefit.134 Additionally,
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Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) 135 that
effectively prohibits states from offering in-state tuition to students lacking legal
immigration status.136 There are no such federal laws barring access to early childhood
education today; although, as discussed in Part I,137 the lack of these sorts of barriers does
not mean that future barriers will not be erected.
C. The Plyler’s Court’s Silence on Early Childhood Education
In Plyler, the Supreme Court did not explicitly limit the definition of public education
to exclude early childhood education. Rather, it was facially agnostic to whether early
childhood education can be considered “public education;” the Court only speaks about
the impermissibility of denying access to “public education” in a broad sense.138 Justice
Brennan refers to “elementary education”139 only once in passing and Justice Powell
discusses only “school-age children.”140 Otherwise, the opinions only include the terms of
“basic education” and “public education.”141 The plaintiffs at bar were elementary schoolaged children; the question of early childhood education was not at bar in a literal sense.
The common conception of public education at the time of the Plyler decision, as argued
above, likely did not include early childhood education .142
Nothing in the text prevents Plyler from applying to preschool; to the contrary,
Michael Olivas, a law professor and expert on Plyler, has said that if litigated, Plyler could
offer protections to preschool aged children.143 New York Times Supreme Court reporter
Linda Greenhouse argues for a narrow interpretation of the opinion that applies only to the
realm of education; she writes, “[Justice] Powell wanted the case to be about the education
of children, not the equal protection of rights of immigrants, and so the decision was.”144
Part of this goes to the majority’s argument regarding the “unique circumstances”
surrounding a basic education, namely the characteristics and purposes of a basic
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education.145 This Note’s argument does not exceed even this more narrow reading of the
Court’s opinion.
Because early childhood education has become a core component of the modern
public education system and because it closely aligns with the purposes of a basic education
as contemplated in Plyler itself, the Supreme Court’s reasoning can be interpreted to also
protect children seeking to attend public early childhood education programs.
IV. USING PLYLER TO ENSURE ACCESS TO EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUCATION PROGRAMS
As Part III asserts, Plyler offers an avenue for courts to protect their ability for
undocumented children and children of undocumented parents to access public early
childhood education programs. This Part discusses how families, advocates, and policy
makers can utilize the interpretation of Plyler offered in this Note to ensure that
undocumented children, and children of undocumented parents, are able to enroll in public
early childhood education programs—both inside and outside of the courtroom.
A. Inside the Courtroom
Undocumented children and the children of undocumented parents can utilize Plyler
in future direct litigation challenging direct and indirect barriers to early childhood
education programs on the basis of immigration status. If children and families decide to
litigate the constitutionality of these barriers to access, they may be able to rely on the
broad reading of Plyler as articulated in Part III that encompasses early childhood
education. In this way, Plyler can be an incredibly useful precedent for claims under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Immigration policies and the
interpretation of immigration laws have been rapidly changing over the last few years.
There is no evidence that Indiana’s pilot program will be the last attempt to restrict access
to public early childhood programs. Cities and states may very well create their own early
childhood programs that attempt to exclude students based on their immigration status in
the future. Programs may also continue to have onerous identification requirements that
deter parents from sending their children to early childhood education programs.146 Plyler
can be useful in challenging these kinds of barriers in court.
Practically, however, litigating the question of whether Plyler applies to early
childhood education will likely be difficult. To date, there is no case that directly address
this central question. If advocates and/or organizational advocates want to litigate this
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. at 239 (Powell, J., concurring). The Court failed to extend Plyler’s application of
intermediate scrutiny in a case where the plaintiffs alleged that a public school district’s policy of charging
a user fee for bus transportation violated the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment. Kadrmas v.
Dickinson Public School, 487 U.S. 450, 459 (1988). The Supreme Court emphasized that it has not
extended Plyler’s holding beyond the “unique circumstances” of primary and secondary education. Id.
Contra Nat’l Law Ctr. on Homelessness & Poverty, R.I. v. New York, 224 F.R.D. 314, 321, (E.D.N.Y.
2004) (where the court argued that the children of homeless parents were not receiving an equal access to
public education, and as such, the county’s policy “penalize[ed] these homeless children because of the
misfortunes or misdeeds of their parents;” the court applies the heightened scrutiny as established in Plyler
based on the importance of education and held that the county’s transportation policy was in violation of
the 14th Amendment).
146
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issue, they will need to find a plaintiff, or class of plaintiffs, who (1) was denied access to
an early childhood education program on the basis of immigration status; (2) who would
be willing to undertake the burden of litigation with no real likelihood of receiving a
remedy for their own child; and (3) is willing to risk potential deportation or other adverse
immigration actions during the course of litigation.147
However, advocates and policy makers can look to executive action as an alternative
means for legal change. For example, the Departments of Education and Justice issued a
joint “Dear Colleague” letter in 2014 that instructed state and local educational agencies to
“become aware of student enrollment practices that may chill or discourage the
participation, or lead to the exclusion, of students based on their or their parents’ or
guardians’ actual or perceived citizenship or immigration status.”148 The letter cites directly
to Plyler and instructs schools to only inquire into parents’ residency for the purpose of
establishing residency in a district and not the country.149 This letter is still in effect but
only pertains to K-12 schools. Plyler can and should be interpreted at the agency level in a
way that applies this policy statement to public early childhood education programs.150
This form of executive directive does invoke the power of the law to directly control
behavior but also makes a statement about our country’s values regarding education of
undocumented children.
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B. Outside the Courtroom: Leveraging Plyler’s Expressive Value
The Supreme Court’s failure to foreclose the applicability of Plyler to the context of
early childhood education can be a powerful tool for advocacy today. The existence of
helpful Supreme Court precedent can be useful for facilitating social change and changes
in the perceptions of undocumented families living in the United States. Prolific legal
scholar, Cass Sunstein, has written on the “expressive function of law,” writing that the
law has a second function apart from controlling behavior to “make statements.” He writes
that through this function, laws can “change social norms.”151 Here, the interpretation of
Plyler posited by this Note has the potential to send a signal to state and local governments
that they should not enact or support policies that directly or indirectly deter parents from
enrolling their children in public early education programs. Further, the existence of
favorable case law can influence policy makers to take preventive steps that reduce the
likelihood that they restrict educational opportunities for these children in the future.
Immigration reform in a way that would improve the quality of life for families
lacking legal documentation in the United States seems elusive today. Federal courts are
hesitant to extend new substantive rights, such as a fundamental right to education, and
Congress is unlikely to legislate to statutorily extend a right to education for these children.
Given this backdrop, Plyler provides an avenue through which families and advocates can
rely on already good law to afford a critical opportunity to an entire generation of children.
CONCLUSION
Early childhood education has become a central component of American public
education. Given the importance of early childhood education on students’ ability to
succeed in later school years and life, cities, states, and the federal government are all
investing in public early childhood education programs that serve students between the
ages of three and five. But as enrollment in these programs has grown, undocumented
children are increasingly facing direct and indirect barriers that limit their ability to enroll
in these public programs—and are, as a result, being deprived of a comprehensive public
education.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Plyler v. Doe offers a means through which these
children, their families, and advocates can challenge direct and indirect barriers to access.
As this Note makes evident, early childhood education programs that serve children under
the age of five fit squarely within the Plyler’s protection. In this era of judicial restraint,
heightened xenophobia, and disagreement over the future of immigration policy, Plyler
offers hope for advocates, families, and policymakers who want to ensure that all children
can receive a truly comprehensive public education.

151

Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2024–25 (1996).

120

